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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 920186-CA

:
:
:
:

Oral Argument
Priority No. 3

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

This appeal seeks review of an Order denying Appellant
Steven Stilling1s (hereinafter "Stilling") Motion to Withdraw his
Guilty Pleas.

Stilling filed a Notice of Appeal on March 17, 1992.

Stilling is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.

This

court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3

(2)

(1953 as amended).

II.
(1)

May

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
the

state

rectify

at

a

later

hearing

the

insufficiency in the taking of guilty pleas in order to overcome
the substantial lack of compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, where the insufficiency is the failure to
establish the factual basis for the taking of the guilty pleas?

A

correctness standard is applied to the district court f s ruling,
pursuant to Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc., v. Dixie Power and
1

Water,

Inc., 789

P.

2d

24

(Utah

1990) . Authority

supporting

Stilling1s position that such supplementation is error:

United

States of America v. Keiswetter, 866 F. 2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989).
(2)

If supplementation of the record of the taking of

the guilty pleas is permitted in this circumstance, was it error to
use the affidavit of Stillingfs own lawyer to fill the void?

A

similar correctness standard. §78-24-8 (2), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), Rules 1.6 and 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar.
(3)

Did the court therefore err in failing to permit the

withdrawal of pre-Gibbons guilty pleas that at the time of their
taking were not in substantial compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure?

A similar correctness standard.

Authority for Stilling*s claim of error:

Boykin v. Alabama, 395

U.S. 238 (1969), Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d
1309

(Utah 1987), State v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1991),

State v. Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983) , North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), United States of America v. Keiswetter,
866 F. 2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989).

III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Any determinative statutes will be cited in the body of
the brief.

2

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
This

NATURE OF THE CASE
is an appeal

from the

lower

court's denial

of

Stillingfs Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Pleas, which was initially
filed as a Petition for a Post Conviction Relief to Set Aside
Guilty Plea.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW.

1.

On February 13, 1985, Stilling pled guilty to three

counts of robbery before the Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde and was committed
to the Utah State Prison for three indeterminate terms of one to
fifteen years, to run concurrently.
2.

On August 28, 1990, Stilling filed in the Second

District Court a pro-se Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Set
Aside Guilty Plea.
3.

(Addendum A.)

Counsel

Office was appointed.

from the Weber County

Public

Defender's

The State filed a Motion to Dismiss and

Stilling, through counsel, filed a Motion to Amend the Petition.
Stilling was given additional time to amend his petition to avoid
its dismissal. Based upon an Affidavit of Bias, Judge Hyde recused
himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Roth.
4.

An Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a

supporting brief were filed pro-se by Stilling on November 30,
1990.
5.

Hearings were held on February 13 and April 24,

1991.

3

6.

Additional

memoranda

were

submitted

after

the

hearings by Stilling pro-se, by his counsel Martin Gravis, and by
the state, which attached to its memorandum supporting its motion
to dismiss an affidavit voluntarily prepared on behalf of the state
by

Stilling 1 s

trial

counsel,

Bernie

Allen,

which

described

confidential communications he had had with his client and which
persuaded Mr. Allen that Stilling well understood what the facts
and the evidence were alleged to be.

Allen also reported his

assessment of Stilling!s mental capabilities and Stilling's demands
for numerous attorney-client meetings, the contents of which were
disclosed in the affidavit. Allen also disclosed in his affidavit
Stilling1s active participation in the wording of the Expiation
Agreement.

At the end of the affidavit Allen wished Stilling

best of absolute luck in his future.11

"the

(R. 97-102) A copy of Bernie

Allen's affidavit is attached as Addendum B.)
7.
Bernie

Allen

Stilling1s counsel moved to quash the affidavit of
as

a violation

of

attorney-client

privilege

and

Stillingfs right to cross-examine Allen.
8.

The court denied the motion to quash.

9.

In August 1991 Mr. Gravis withdrew as counsel and

the undersigned entered her appearance.
10.

A Memorandum of Clarification was filed on behalf of

Stilling, advising the court that despite the prior pleading titles
and designations, the matter pending should be considered a Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Pleas and should therefore be restyled as such.
Subsequent pleadings

contained

both the case number given the
4

Petition and the original district court numbers in which the
guilty pleas were entered.

The Notice of Appeal designated all

four case numbers.
11.

The hearing on the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty

Pleas was held on October 9, 1991, at which time the court denied
the motion.
12.
proposed
Stilling.

Findings

of

by the state.

Fact

and

Conclusions

Objections were

of

Law

filed by counsel

were
for

The court adopted the state's findings and conclusions,

entering its order on February 7, 1992.
13.

(Addendum C.)

Through oversight, the court failed to notify the

parties of the entry of its order.

On March 16, 1992, the court

entered a Notice of Entry of Findings and Order, beginning the
thirty day appeal period.
14.

On March

17, 1992, Stilling filed his Notice of

Appeal in Case No. 16269, 16271, 16272, and 900902323.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Stilling was charged with four counts of Aggravated

Robbery, felonies of the first degree, and one count of being a
Habitual Criminal and arraigned on those charges on August 31,
1984, before the Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde, who had the clerk read aloud
to Stilling the Informations filed in the cases. (R. 95 of the
original criminal files (hereinafter "OCF"), as distinguished from
the 1990 Writ file.)
2.

On February

13,1985, Second Amended

Informations

charging Stilling with three counts of Robbery, felonies of the
5

second

degree, were

filed

in three of the

district court before Judge Hyde.

four cases

in the

At Stilling's arraignment that

same day on those charges, the Second Amended Informations were not
read by the clerk or by the judge to Stilling.
3.

(R. 144-145 OCF)

To those three counts of robbery

Stilling

pled

guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970),
under

which

Stilling

maintained

his

innocence

while

pleading

guilty, in order to accept a favorable plea bargain. (R. 146-147
OCF)
4.

At that arraignment and entry of guilty pleas, no

one presented to the court any factual basis to support the taking
of those pleas.

The court made no inquiry regarding the factual

basis for the pleas and neither the prosecutor nor the defense
attorney proffered what facts could support a finding of guilt in
any of the cases. (R. 147-150 OCF)
5.

Paragraph 8

(e) of the Expiation Agreement, aka

Guilty Plea Affidavit, prepared by Bernie Allen acknowledged that
Stilling maintained his innocence.
6.

(R 264 OCF)

The court made no findings on the record regarding

Stilling f s understanding of the nature of his pleas nor of the
voluntariness of those pleas.
7.
voluntariness

The

(R. 147-150 OCF)

court never

of Stilling1s

signed

the Order

pleas, leaving

blank. (R. 266 OCF)

6

the

regarding
signature

the
line

8.

Minimum time for sentencing was waived and on that

same date Stilling was sentenced to three indeterminate terms of
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, where he remains.
9.

An appeal was taken in 1985 on issues unrelated to

the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Please; the Court of Appeals
affirmed.

V.
A,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

THE STATE MAY NOT RECTIFY AT A LATER HEARING THE

INSUFFICIENCY IN THE TAKING OF GUILTY PLEAS SO AS TO OVERCOME THE
SUBSTANTIAL LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

WHERE

THE

INSUFFICIENCY

IS

THE

FAILURE

TO

ESTABLISH THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF THE GUILTY PLEAS.
The lower court concluded that if it were bound by the
record made at the time Judge Hyde took the guilty pleas, it would
find

that there was

not

substantial

compliance

with

Rule 11.

However, Judge Roth found that the contemporaneous record could be
supplemented seven years later by an affidavit that satisfied the
requirement of the existence of a factual basis to support the
taking of guilty pleas seven years earlier and defeat a motion to
withdraw

those guilty pleas.

Stilling claims that while some

minor deficiencies surrounding the taking of guilty pleas may be
subsequently rectified, the failure to establish on the record at
the time of the taking of the guilty plea the facts which the state
relies upon to support the charges made is not an error that can be
corrected later and applied retroactively.

7

B.

ASSUMING,

ARGUENDO,

THAT

SUPPLEMENTATION

OF

THE

RECORD TO ESTABLISH A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF A GUILTY PLEA
IS PERMITTED, AN AFFIDAVIT OF THE DEFENDANT'S LAWYER FILED OVER THE
OBJECTION OF THE CLIENT, MAY NOT BE USED TO FILL THE VOID IN THE
RECORD.
Upon request of the state and without subpoena, order of
the court, or permission of the client, Stillingfs lawyer prepared
a lengthy affidavit to be used by the state against Stilling, to
whom he still owed a duty of confidentiality and a duty to not use
information acquired from his client in a manner adverse to him.
Those duties arise under the Rules of Professional Conduct and the
statutory protection of the attorney-client privilege.

It was

clear error for Judge Roth to consider and rely upon that affidavit
to find that it sufficiently supplemented the record so that the
1985 taking of the guilty pleas was now through evidence created
and acquired in 1991 in substantial compliance with Rule 11.
C.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DENY STILLING1 S MOTION

TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS.
Where the contemporaneous record of the taking of the
guilty pleas in 1984 did not substantially comply with Rule 11
because the court failed to make an inquiry about the factual basis
supporting the pleas and the prosecution did not proffer
facts,

the

only

appropriate

remedy

is

the

granting

of

defendant's motion to withdraw those improperly taken pleas.

8

such
the

VI•
A.

ARGUMENT

THE STATE MAY NOT RECTIFY AT A LATER HEARING THE

INSUFFICIENCY IN THE TAKING OF GUILTY PLEAS IN ORDER TO OVERCOME
THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHERE THE INSUFFICIENCY IS THE FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF THE GUILTY PLEAS.
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
the framework for the taking of traditional guilty pleas in which
a defendant admits the elements of the crime.1

Inherent in that

process is an exchange between the court and the accused through
which the court advises the accused of his several constitutional
rights that shall be waived upon entry of a plea of guilty, sets
out the elements of the crime, and determines whether the plea is
knowingly

and voluntarily

entered

and

is an admission

of the

elements of the crime. State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987)
further refined the obligations of the court in the plea taking
process and set the standard of compliance with Rule 11.

State v.

Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1991) clarified the standard of
compliance

for

guilty

pleas

taken

pre-Gibbons,

holding

that

Rule 11. Pleas.
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no
contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has
found:
•

• •

(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of
the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the
plea is an admission of all those elements;
9

substantial compliance, not strict compliance, is required

for

those pleas to withstand a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Non-traditional guilty pleas, such as Alford pleas or
pleas of guilty and mentally ill, require supplemental inquiries.
With

the

latter

plea

the trial

court must

satisfy

itself by

conversations with the defendant and with counsel that although the
defendant is mentally ill, he or she is sufficiently competent to
knowingly enter such a plea.

With the former the court must

satisfy itself that facts exist upon which a conviction could be
obtained because the nature of a plea pursuant to North Carolina v.
Alford, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970) is that the defendant maintains his
innocence while pleading guilty.

Stilling's guilty pleas were

Alford pleas.
The need to establish on the record the factual basis to
support a guilty plea arises from the constitutional protections
of the accused and the presumption of innocence.

There is no

societal value in coercing fearful but innocent defendants into
pleading guilty.

As articulated in Alford:

Because of the importance of protecting the innocent
and of insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free
and intelligent choice, various state and federal court
decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims
of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a
factual basis for the plea...(citations omitted); and
until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and
sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of
trial and the claim of innocence. (Citations omitted.)
91 S.Ct. at 167-168, footnote 10.
Consequently,
receive

a

in cases

proffer

involving Alford pleas, the court must

from

one

of
10

the

parties,

typically

the

prosecutor, regarding what its evidence would be that would sustain
a guilty verdict; or alternatively, as in Alford, the court must
hear testimony

from

a police officer

or other witnesses

that

likewise establish the elements of the crime. These procedures, in
conjunction

with

other

Rule

11

requirements,

give

the

court

assurances that the plea is knowing and voluntary, and that there
are

facts

that

would

likely

support

a

conviction,

essential

features of any valid guilty plea.
Given the facts that in the instant case the trial judge
neither read the Amended Informations to Stilling nor discussed
with him the elements of those offenses nor had any person—lawyer
or witness—indicate what facts supported the charges nor made any
findings regarding the knowing or voluntary nature of the pleas,
Judge Roth found that the record made at the time of the taking of
Stillingfs guilty pleas did not demonstrate substantial compliance
with Rule 11:
At the time the plea was taken by Judge Hyde on the
issue of Rule 11 specifically, the issue of whether he
convinced himself that the Defendant understood the
elements of the crime and how the facts related to it, he
was not in substantial compliance with Rule 11. And to
the extent that North Carolina v. Alford requires that
the Court determine there is a factual basis for entering
the plea, the evidence is very slim. T. 43
That critical finding by Judge Roth has not been challenged by the
state.
Having

made

that

finding,

however,

Judge

Roth,

in

reliance on Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) ruled that
the state could supplement the record that existed in 1985 with new
testimony that would become part of "the record as a whole"; and if
11

that newly created

record as a whole erased the deficiencies,

Stillingfs motion to withdraw his guilty pleas would be denied.
(R.163-164)

Stilling contends that the court's reliance on Jolivet

is misplaced and that supplementation of the record was error.
The

trial

court

in Jolivet

failed

to make

findings

regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty pleas,
including

the

possibility

of

consecutive

sentences.

In

a

subsequent hearing before a different district court judge, to
determine whether Jolivet

should be permitted

to withdraw his

guilty pleas, the court reviewed the record as a whole, as it
existed at the time of the guilty pleas, and concluded that the
guilty plea were knowingly

and voluntarily made, and that the

defendant understood that consecutive sentences might be imposed.
Jolivet ! s pleas were traditional guilty pleas, not Alford pleas.
In his review of the record, the court noted that at the
time of the entry of the guilty pleas, "the judge read the charges
and had the facts relating to those charges stated.

The judge then

asked Jolivet if the factual situations relating to the crimes
charged were fairly and fully stated.
affirmative.11
consecutive

784

P. 2d

sentences,

at

1149.

the

court

Jolivet answered in the
Regarding

found

that

the
at

matter
the

of

first

arraignment on the charges, the judge told Jolivet that the court
could impose consecutive or concurrent sentences and asked Jolivet
if he understood those possibilities.
did. Consequently, the court
knowingly

and

voluntarily

Jolivet indicated that he

found that the guilty pleas were

made,
12

with

full

knowledge

of

the

possibility

of consecutive

sentences.

The Utah Supreme Court

affirmed the denial of Jolivetfs motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas.
The "record as a whole" considered by the lower court and
by the appellate court was the record of the case as it existed at
the

time

of

the

taking

testimony was received.
Roth's

reliance

on

of the

guilty

pleas.

No

additional

Therefore, in the instant case Judge

Jolivet

was

misplaced;

while

Jolivet

was

entitled to a hearing on a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, he
was not entitled to enlarge the record as a whole that was under
consideration.
Stilling!s claim that the "record as a whole" refers to
the record that existed at the time of the taking of the entry of
the plea and not to a supplemented record created seven years after
the entry of the guilty plea is further supported by State v.
Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 440

(Utah 1983) , which found that the

record at the time of the taking of the plea demonstrated that
Breckenridgefs guilty plea was uninformed and involuntary.

In

reversing the lower court's denial of Breckenridge's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the court stated that "the record recites
no factual basis from which we might conclude that an arson ever
occurred." 688 P.2d at 443.
In its opening paragraph the court succinctly captured
the issue:
The dispositive question is whether a conviction
based on a plea may stand where there is no record of
facts showing that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant, or that the defendant has for
13

some
other
legitimate
reason
intelligently
and
voluntarily entered such a plea. See North Carolina v.
Alford. We reverse. (Citation omitted.)
The issue was decided upon the state of the record as it existed at
the time of the taking of the guilty plea.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit reached the conclusion urged
by Stilling in United States v. Keiswetter, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th
Cir. 1989).

Although protesting his innocence Keiswetter entered

a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford to the crime
of conversion.
was denied.

He timely moved to withdraw his plea; such motion

On appeal the panel concluded that "the record failed

to demonstrate that the plea was properly accepted in the first
instance because of the absence of evidence of a factual basis for
the plea", citing Fed. R. Crim P. 11(f). 2 866 F.2d at 1302.

It

initially remanded the case to the district court to give that
judge a chance to clarify his reasons for having made a finding
that a factual basis existed for the charge to which Mr. Keiswetter
pled guilty. United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d. 992 (10th Cir.
1988) .
In a strong dissent Judge John Moore objected to the
remand, stated that the plea was invalid, and that "allowing the
trial

court

the

opportunity

to

revitalize

it

is

a

post

hoc

disposition that is unparalleled in our jurisprudence." 860 F.2d at

2

Fed. R. Crim P. 11 (f) provides:
"Notwithstanding the
acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." There is no
comparably explicit Utah rule, which has acknowledged this
requirement by case law.
14

998.

He discussed the two aspects of an Alford plea: the first

requires the judge to determine the voluntariness of the plea, that
is, that the defendant understands what he is doing, what rights he
is waiving, and what the consequences may be; the second requires
that the court be presented evidence at the taking of the plea that
strongly suggests the guilt of the accused.

"Without such strong

evidence, refusal to permit the withdrawal of the plea would result
in

the

anachronism

of

forcing

a

conviction

to

stand

without

evidence of guilt." 860 F.2d. at 998.
On a rehearing en banc Judge Moore got to write the
majority opinion, all but one of his colleagues having concluded
that his earlier dissenting

opinion was correct. The Court of

Appeals reversed the judgement of the district court and remanded
the case with

instructions to vacate the Keiswetter's plea of

guilty.
In the instant case there is no case law that authorized
the lower court to permit the state a chance to rehabilitate and
supplement the record and to create substantial compliance with
Rule 11 six years after the taking of the pleas.

Under these

circumstances, vacating the guilty pleas is the only remedy.
B.

ASSUMING,

ARGUENDO,

THAT

SUPPLEMENTATION

OP

THE

RECORD IS ALLOWED, IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE USE OF AN AFFIDAVIT
OF

STILLINGfS

OWN

LAWYER

IN

THE

ATTEMPT

TO

CORRECT

THE

DEFICIENCIES.
At the request of the prosecutor and without consultation
with or consent of Stilling, the lawyer who represented Stilling in
15

1985 filed a lengthy affidavit with the court, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Addendum 3.

Bernie Allen did so without a court

order directing him to give testimony; he did so without a subpoena
have been served upon him to coerce testimony; and he did so in
utter disregard of or indifference to his duty of confidentiality
to his client, a duty that is at the center of the Rules of
Professional

Conduct

and which

separately

is

owed

under

Utah

statutes that protect privileged communications.
Utah Code Ann. 78-24-8

(1953 as amended) prefaces its

enumeration of statutory privileges with this language:
particular

relations

in which

"There are

it is the policy of the law to

encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate.11 It then sets
out at (2) the attorney-client privilege:

"An attorney cannot,

without

examined

the

communication
regarding

consent
made

by

of

his

the

client,

client

the communication

be

to him

or his

as

to

advice

in the course of his

any

given

professional

employment."
The privilege is the client's, not the lawyer's.
the client's to waive or not to waive.

It is

The court's findings cite

Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888) as the precedent for the
proposition that Stilling waived his attorney-client privilege with
Bernie Allen.

Blackburn

is a real estate case, in which the

defendant reported communications between herself and her attorney
and claimed that he had deceived, misled, and misadvised her in the
matter which had resulted in a lawsuit against her.

The Court held

that once Mrs. Blackburn had voluntarily revealed what she claimed
16

were the secret communications between her lawyer and her, she
could not prevent the lawyer from providing testimony regarding
those same conversations.

The Blackburn case has no relevance to

the instant case and Judge Roth erred in being misled by the
prosecutor
Stilling

in

the

never

matter

disclosed

of

the

attorney-client

in

any

pleading

any

privilege.
confidential

communications he had with Bernie Allen so Allen's affidavit is not
analogous to the circumstances in Blackburn.
Furthermore, with Blackburn's irrelevancy, the issue
surrounding

Allen's

affidavit

is

identifying

some

other

confidentiality exception which would justify its publication.
There is none.

There is no rule of criminal law that holds that

whenever a defendant alleges his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise the issue of non-compliance with Rule 11 that
the allegedly ineffective lawyer is permitted to turn against the
client

and

use

confidential

communications

and

subjective

impressions about his client to defeat the ineffectiveness claim.
In fact, the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct jealously
protect attorney-client secrets and have adopted a more stringent
rule than the model rule upon which it is based. The Utah Rule 1.6
provides in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client except as stated in
paragraph
(b) , unless the client consents after
disclosure.... (b) A lawyer may reveal such information
to the extent the lawyer believes necessary: ... (3) To
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client or to
establish a claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved;"
17

The Model Rule adds this language to the above-cited
provision:
...or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
The Utah Supreme Court declined to adopt that broader language,
preferring to restrict the opportunities for disclosure of client
confidences. Consequently, Mr. Allen, who was unwisely both trial
and appellate counsel, ought not have filed his affidavit in this
matter.
However, whether or not appellate counsel was ineffective
became a moot issue in this case, so whatever mistakenly claimed
basis

there

was

for

its

submission

disappeared.

When

the

undersigned entered this case on behalf of Stilling, she recognized
that Stilling f s plea was entered prior to the enactment of the
statute that limits the time period for filing a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea.

The court was advised that the matter to be decided

was really such a motion and was not properly a petition for postconviction or habeas relief. The prosecution acknowledged that the
ineffectiveness of counsel claim had been abandoned.
In

addition

to

violating

the

above-cited

(T. 2-3,11)
statutory

provision and Rule 1.6, Mr. Allen's affidavit also violated Rule
1.9, which provides in pertinent part:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter:
...(b)
Use
information
relating
to
the
representation to the disadvantage of the former client
except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client
or when the information has become generally known.

18

When Mr. Allen testified via affidavit, he provided information
that became the essential basis relied upon by Judge Roth for
denying his former client's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
See Findings of Fact attached (T. 44):
...I am allowing that Affidavit of Mr. Allen. And
I believe that his statements concerning discussions
about the elements of the crime, and his discussions
about the facts, where he suggests that he reviewed in
great detail the police report, the witnessesfs
statements, and had discussions with his client, and it
was their opinion that there was very little chance of
winning on the facts had they gone to trial, but he
thought he had some issues he could prevail on appeal.
That coupled with the expiation statement, which is to
the same effect, satisfied North Carolina Vs. Alvord
(sic).
Ignoring for a moment the fact that drafting and filing
the affidavit was contrary to law and to the ethical standards that
govern our profession, the Allen affidavit still did not provide
the factual basis required for a valid plea.
only went

to the

state

of mind

Allen's affidavit

of Stilling,

including

his

perception of the strength of the evidence, the risk of loss at
trial, and his awareness of the consequences of the plea.

It was

the second part of a valid Alf ord plea that was missing, and
Allen's affidavit could not and did not fill that void:

the

establishment in the presence of and for the benefit of the judge
and the accused the factual basis for the pleas—the enunciation of
the evidence

that would
The

have

supported

preparation,

use,

and

verdicts of guilt.
acceptance

of

the

affidavit of the lawyer who represented Stilling at his guilty
pleas and who thereafter did his appeal (on other issues), where
such affidavit was barred by the attorney-client privilege and the
19

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and was prepared for a claim
that was withdrawn by Stilling, was a serious error.
The error was aggravated by the fact that the contents
of the affidavit considered only the voluntariness of the p l e a —
that Stilling knew that it was in his best interest to accept the
negotiated settlement and plea—when from the first post-conviction
motion filed in this case by Stilling the claims had been that:
[t]he judge at sentencing did not comply with Rule
11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in that: (a)
The Judge failed to ask each of the appropriate
questions, nor did the Judge determine that there was a
factual basis for the plea.
(R.002)
Voluntariness

was not the

issue

although

Judge

Roth

seemed unable to separate the voluntariness prong from the factual
basis prong.
C.

WHERE THE RECORD MADE AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF

AN ALFORD PLEA DEMONSTRATES A LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY FAILING TO
ESTABLISH THE FACTS THAT COULD SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILT, THE ONLY
REMEDY IS VACATION OF THE GUILTY PLEAS.
At one point in the hearing in the court below, the judge
observed that the case "is kind of a bucket of worms at this
point."

(T.25)

He

attempted

an

ad

hoc,

crazy-quilt

remedy,

admitting that he wasn't sure how Hoff and Jolivet interplay and
affect Stilling and puzzled about Alford's implications. (T. 20,
26, 27, 30, 36, 43, 44). He was sure that in 1985 Judge Hyde had
not

substantially

complied

with
20

Rule

11

and

the

1985

record

conclusively demonstrates that the court never established the
factual basis

for the pleas

in any of the three cases.

The

colloquy with Stilling went only to Stilling1s understanding of
what he was doing; the court ignored the equally important issue of
satisfying itself that there was a set of facts that would likely
support a conviction in these cases. That defect is not capable of
repair.

For reasons set forth in Keiswetter the only remedy is

vacation of the pleas.

VII.

CONCLUSION

For reasons set forth above, Stilling urges this court to
reverse the judgment

of the lower court, vacate the pleas of

guilty, and remand these cases to the trial court to undertake
further proceedings upon Stilling*s pleas of not guilty to the
original charges.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

*7

day of September,

1992.
HALEY & STOLEBARGER:

Jo 'Carol Nesset-Sale
Attorney for Appellant
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^M^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

~

day of September,

1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, David B.
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 6100 South 300 East, Suite
403, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107.

^^ti
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ADDENDUM A

Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Set Aside Guilty Plea,
filed August 28, 1990

004113

&CTCOMT
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING
Attorney Pro Se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT
84020

'30 AUG 25 P!) i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF
TO SET ASIDE GUILTY
PLEA

vs.
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

Case

Defendant.
oooOooo
COMES NOW the Petitioner,

No. % & & & 3 <i9

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

and for

cause of action alleges as follows:
1.
February

A

committment

of

1965

order

Petitioner with three charges:
That

issued on

by the Honorable Judge

District Court of Weber County,

2.

was

Petitioner

was

the

Hyde,

January

Judge

State of Utah which hz\6

of

or
the

charged

16269, 16271, 16272.
sentenced to a

term

of

one

to

Petitioner appealed the sentence on the basis

of

fifteen, after making an Alfred plea.
3.

That

the Interstate Detainer Act, to the Utah Supreme Court, which was
affirmed in 1987.
4.

That Petitioner is currently located at the Utah State

1

Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 64020.
5.

That

Petitioner's

unconstitutional in that:

restraint

is

unlawful

and

The Judge at sentencing did not comply

with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure in that:
The

a.
questions,

Judge

failed

to

ask

each

of

the

appropriate

nor did the Judge determine that there was a

factual

basis for the plea.
b.

That these matters have not been previously ruled

upon

by this court or by any other court.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule

a

hearing

at which time Petitioner

may

be

represented.
2.

Permit

Petitioner,

who remains indigent,

to

proceed

without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.
3.

Grant

Forma Pauperis,
in

the

proof

Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas
for witnesses and documents necessary to
of the facts alleged in the

petition

as

in

assist
stated

above.
4.

Issue a Petition for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner

brought

before

it,

to

discharged

from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and

2

the

end

that

he

may

be

restraint.
DATED this J'J>._ day of

[/^c^c^ct.«s t

> 1990.

Steven Michael Stilling
Attorney Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
the

hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct

foregoinq

prepaid,

to

Building,
Jkv*st*<&fc

Petition
the

Salt

fo-r

Post

Conviction

Attorney General's Office,

Lake

City,

Utah

* 1390

3

64114,

copy

of

Relief,

postage

236 State

Capitol

this

_J_5L

d

^y

of

ADDENDUM B
Affidavit of Bernard L. Allen, filed June 13, 1991

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
300 East 6100 South, Suite #204
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 2 65-5638

JUN 1 3 1991

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF WEBER

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

:

Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT OF
BERNARD L. ALLEN

:

vs.

:

STATE OF UTAH, Utah Department:
of Corrections,
:

Case No, 900902323 HC

Respondent.

Judge David E. Roth

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER
COMES NOW,

:

)
: ss
)
BERNARD

L. ALLEN, being

duly

sworn upon

his

oath, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of

Utah and was so in 1985.
2.

In 1985 I was, and still am, an attorney with the lav;

firm of Richards, Caine & Allen in Ogden, Utah.

I was trial

counsel at that time for the Petitioner in the above captioned
matter

as a contract

attorney

for the Weber

County

Public

Defenders Association and have personal knowledge of the matters
addressed in this Affidavit.
1

3.

That Petitioner was charged with four (4) First Degree

Aggravated Robberies, penalties of five (5) years to life; a
Habitual Criminal Enhancement with a penalty of five (5) years
to life and a one (1) to five (5) year enhancement for use of a
firearm.
4.

Through plea negotiations, an offer was presented to

the Petitioner, which he accepted, consisting

of three

(3)

Second Degree Robberies with penalties of one (1) to fifteen
(15) years.

The

fourth Aggravated

Robbery

and all of the

discuss

this

enhancements were dismissed.
5.

I had

an

opportunity

Petitioner at great length.

to

case

with

Unlike many of the clients I was

representing at that time, I found the Petitioner to be very
bright and very knowledgeable regarding the criminal justice
system.
6.

I thought that his cases presented interesting and

potentially

winnable

issue

for

appeal,

whereas

both

the

Petitioner and I felt that the prospects of actually winning a
trial on any of the four (4) cases, based on the fact situation,
was very slim indeed.
7.

I had an opportunity

in my representation

of the

Petitioner to review in great detail the police reports, witness
statements regarding the offenses and I made a very

strong

argument to the Deputy County Attorney regarding his position on
the potential

issue

for appeal

and

I though that the plea

negotiation was extremely favorable under the circumstances of
2

the facts and evidence that they had against the Petitioner on
the original charges.
8. The Petitioner was very much in agreement regarding the
value of the plea negotiation, knowing that he had little, if
any, chance of winning the Aggravated Robbery cases had we gone
to Trial.
9.

As I recall, the Petitioner's record was not good and

we understood from the outset that his sentence would involve
Prison.
10.

We discussed the elements of Aggravated Robbery at

great length and attempted to examine them in detail in an
effort to find a factual basis for escaping conviction.
11.

I found the Petitioner to be extremely helpful in

reviewing the evidence and the law and would categorize him as
a better than average jailhouse lawyer.
12.

When the County Attorney's Office went along with the

plea negotiation, we did discuss in detail the elements of the
reduced pleas, in particular

the fact that it was still a

robbery, but that the reduction had taken out any mention of any
type of weapon.

This of course was extremely important to the

Petitioner because it removed the sentencing enhancements that
would have accompanied convictions on the Aggravated Robberies
because of the use of a firearm in those robberies.
13.

At the time of the entry of the plea, the actual

elements of the robberies were not a grave issue, because
although Petitioner was pleading guilty and understood fully
3

that he would be sentenced and dealt with by the Courts at
sentencing as though this were an unconditional guilty plea, the
Petitioner indicated on the record that he was not specifically
admitting any guilt to any specific elements of any offense, but
was

accepting

the

plea

negotiation

to

greatly

reduce

his

exposure to penalty in the cases and to ripen the matter for
appeal.
14.

Therefore, although the elements of the offense of

robbery were discussed in detail with the Petitioner by myself
and

the

Amended

Informations

given

to

him

which

he

read

thoroughly, the actual offense that he plead to was not really
that important to him.

The main importance to the Petitioner at

the time was that the penalties were one (1) to fifteen (15)
potential years in Prison, rather than five (5) to life, plus
enhancements and that he reserve the issues that he felt were
important for an appeal.
15.

As I was the attorney representing the Petitioner also

on appeal, I did have an opportunity to review the record, but
again the specific elements of the offense of robbery were well
within the grasp and understanding of the Petitioner and he
verbally acknowledged to me, on numerous occasions, that he
understood what he was doing.
16.

The

elements

of

the

offense

again

were

not

particularly important to the appeal either, because frankly the
charges could have been reduced to any Second Degree Felony,
because

it

was

really

the

potential
4

penalty

that

was

of

importance to the Petitioner and not the specific offense.
17.

It was my understanding at the time of the entry of

plea and in reviewing the case as well, that the Petitioner was
not specifically

admitting to any elements of any criminal

offense, but was agreeing to accept the penalty regardless of
that in an effort to reduce his exposure.
18.

This was not a case which unfortunately can some times

happen where

the actual time

relatively minimal.

spent with

the Petitioner

is

This Petitioner demanded and because of my

interest in the case, I acquiesced to numerous lengthy meetings
with

the

Petitioner

regarding

the

facts

of

the

case, the

potential for appeal and the eventual plea negotiation.
19.

In those meetings the Petitioner made it clear to me

that he fully and completely understood the facts of the case
against him and the elements of the crimes with which he was
charged and the elements of the crime that he plead to in the
negotiation.
20.

Finally, in reviewing the statement by Petitioner in

advance of plea, Petitioner took an active part in the wording
of

that

Expiation

personally,

Agreement

and

then

reviewed

it with

me

initialing each of the paragraphs expressing an

understanding of the contents of the document.
21.

In

conclusion,

I

found

the

Petitioner

to

be a

fascinating individual to talk to and a person with a surprising
amount of sophistication regarding the workings of the criminal
justice

system

and

found

him
5

to

be

extremely

helpful

in

reviewing the facts and the evidence in the case and posturing
the matter for appeal. There is no question in my mind that he
fully understood what he was doing in entering the plea and
absolutely no question that if he had not understood any aspect
of the process that he would have grilled me with questions
until he did fully understand.
22. In spite of the Petitionees difficulties, I developed
genuine affection for him and wish him the best of absolute luck
in his future. This is my best recollection of the things that
transpired in my representation of Petitioner.
23.

Further your Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this /3

day of June, 19^1.

Affiant
is -7—^^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befo

day of June,

1991
f

= % * .

SS-*<z^

—"ROTARY PUBLIC i>
mtm
PAM J. PONTIUS
*908NOfth1225Easl ,
No Ogdon, ut^f^
R^uf
H y CommrssfO i Cvnuus'
Oct 11, i9i«:
:
STATE OF u> AH |
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ADDENDUM C
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed February 10, 1992

•'
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;TV

. .... i I

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-5638

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
t^oti«l
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v,

:

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

:

Case No,

:

Judge David ^ L Roth

Defendant.

900902323

Defendant's petition to withdraw his guilty plea came on
for hearing on October 9, 1991 at 3:01 p.m., before the Honorable
DavidS£L Roth, Second District Court Judge. Defendant was present
and represented by Jo Carol Nesset-Sale. Plaintiff was represented
by David F. Bryant Assistant Attorney General.

After hearing

arguments of counsel and receiving exhibits, and the court being
fully advised in the premises, the court now enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court finds that Defendant was convicted of three
counts

of

robbery, all

second degree

felonies, in the

Second

Judicial District Court,
2.

After

entering

guilty

pleas

pursuant

to

North

Carolina v. Alford to all three counts, Defendant was sentenced to
three terms of one to fifteen years,
3. Defendant is currently incarcerated at the Utah State
Prison in Draper, Utah,
4.

The amended informations to which Defendant plead

guilty were read and understood by Defendant, and he discussed them
with his counsel.
5.

Defendant was in possession of copies of the amended

informations.
6.

Defendant's trial counsel, Bernard Allen, discussed

the case at length with Defendant,
7.

Bernard Allen discussed the elements of aggravated

robbery and the elements of the reduced

charges of robbery at

length with Defendant, as well as the proposed plea bargain,
8.

Defendant had a thorough understanding of his case

and even helped his counsel draft the expiation agreement.
9.

Other than the amended informations, the record does

not indicate that either the prosecuting attorney or witnesses
2

presented additional evidence to independently establish a factual
basis for each charge.
10. Based upon the record as a whole, Defendant's guilty
plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.
11.

The record as a whole includes evidence received

pursuant to Defendant's attempt to obtain post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

2. The affidavit of Bernard Allen, entered as an exhibit
in response to Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, is
part of the record as a whole.

Jolivet v. Cook/ 784 P. 2d 1148

(Utah 1989) .
3. Despite a lack of substantial compliance with Utah R.
Crim. P. 11, at the taking of the guilty plea, the State can
demonstrate

that the plea was knowing and voluntary through

evidence taken as a consequence of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus.

Jolivet v. Cook.
4.

If the court were to rely only on the record as it

existed at the time of the pleas, that record would be insufficient
to establish substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11.
5.

The affidavit of Bernard Allen demonstrates that

Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
6.

If a pre-Gibbons guilty plea is not in substantial
3

compliance with Utah Rule Crim. P. 11, the State may demonstrate
that the plea was knowing and voluntary through the record as a
whole.

Jolivet v. Cook.
6.

The affidavit of Bernard Allen did not violate the

attorney/client privilege. The privilege was waived when Defendant
made

claims

of

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel.

Hunt

v.

Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
ORDER
The above-captioned matter came on for hearing on October
9, 1991 at 3:01 p.m., before the Honorable David ©L-Roth, Second
District Court Judge.

The court having entered its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefore, it
is hereby:
ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the petition for withdrawal of guilty plea is

denied.

DATED t h i s

day o f ^ J a n u a r y ,

/992,

foifOfeAg£E

DAVID'^JROTH
Second District Court
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